Theosophical Society's Publication

THE

# SÁNKHYA KÁRIKA,

BY

ÍSWARA KRISHNA,

TRANSLATED FROM THE SANSCRIT

BY

**HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE, ESQ.**

ALSO

THE BHASHYA, OR, COMMENTARY OF

## GAUDAPADA;

TRANSLATED AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT,

BY

HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, M.A.F.R.S.

PUBLISHED

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# सांख्यकारिका अथवा सांख्ययोग.

# SÁNKHYA KÁRIKÁ

OR

## SANKHYA YOGA.

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदभिघातके हेतौ
दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥१॥

THE inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment: nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished.

## सांख्यकारिकाभाष्यम्.

कपिलाय नमस्तस्मै येनाविद्योदधौ जगति मग्ने ।
कारुण्यात्सांख्यमयी नौरिव विहिता प्रतरणाय ॥
अल्पग्रन्थं स्पष्टं प्रमाणसिद्धान्तहेतुभिर्युक्तम् ।
शास्त्रं शिष्यहिताय समासतोऽहं प्रवक्ष्यामि ॥

दुखत्रयेति । अस्या आद्यार्या उपोद्घातः क्रियते ॥ इह भगवान्ब्रह्मसुतः कपिलो नाम । तद्यथा—

सनकश्चसनन्दनश्च तृतीयश्च सनातनः ।
आसुरिः कपिलश्चैव वोढुः पञ्चशिखस्तथा ।
इत्येते ब्रह्मणः पुत्राः सप्त प्रोक्ता महर्षयः ॥

कपिलस्य सहोत्पन्ना धर्म्मो ज्ञानं वैराग्यमैश्वर्य्यञ्चेति । एवं स उत्पन्नः सन्नन्धतमसि मज्जज्जगदालोक्य संसारपारम्पर्य्येण सत्कारुण्यो जिज्ञासमानाय आसुरिसगोत्राय ब्रह्मणायेदं पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानां ज्ञानमुक्तवान् । यस्य ज्ञानाद्दुःखक्षयो भवति ।

पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र तत्राश्रमे वसेत् ।
जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि मुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥

तदिदमाहुः । दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासेति । तत्र दुःखत्रयं—आध्यात्मिकं । आधिभौतिकं आधिदैविकं चेति ॥ तत्राध्यात्मिकं द्विविधं—शारीरं मानसं चेति । शारीरं वातपित्तश्लेष्मविपर्य्ययकृतं ज्वरातीसारादि । मानसं प्रियवियोगाप्रियसंयोगादि ॥ आधिभौतिकं चतुर्विधं—भूतग्रामनिमित्तं मनुष्यपशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपदंशमशकयूकामत्कुणमत्स्यमकरग्राहस्थावरेभ्यो जरायुजाण्डजस्वेदजोद्भिज्जेभ्यः सकाशादुपजायते ॥ आधिदैविकं—देवानामिदं दैविकं । दिवः प्रभवतीति वा दैवं तदधिकृत्य यदुपजायते शीतोष्णवातवर्षाशनिपातादिकं ॥ एवं यथा दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा कार्य्या क्व । तदभिघातके हेतौ । तस्य दुःखत्रयस्य अभिघातको योऽसौ हेतुस्तत्रेति॥ दृष्टे सापार्था चेत् । दृष्टे हेतौ दुःखत्रयाभिघातके सा जिज्ञासाऽपार्था चेद्यदि । तत्राध्यात्मिकस्य द्विविधस्यापि आयुर्वेदशास्त्रक्रियया प्रियसमागमाप्रियपरिहारकटुतिक्तकषायादिक्काथादिभिर्दृष्ट एव आध्यात्मिकोपायः । आधिभौतिकस्य रक्षादिनाऽभिघातो दृष्टः । दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेदेवं म-

न्यसे । न । एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् । यत एकान्ततोऽवश्यं अत्यन्ततो नित्यं दृष्टेन हेतुनाऽभिघातो न भवति तस्मादन्यत्र एकान्तात्यन्ताभिघातके हेतौ जिज्ञासा विविदिषा कार्येति ।

# BHÁSHYA.

Salutation to that KAPILA by whom the Sánkhya philosophy was compassionately imparted, to serve as a boat for the purpose of crossing the ocean of ignorance in which the world was immersed.

I will declare compendiously the doctrine, for the benefit of students; a short easy work, resting on authority, and establishing certain results.

*Three sorts of pain.*—The explanation of this *Áryá* stanza is as follows:

The divine KAPILA, the son of BRAHMA indeed: as it is said; "SANAKA, SANANDANA, and SANATANA the third; ÁSURI, KAPILA, BORHU, and PANCHASIKHA: these seven sons of Brahmá were termed great sages." Together with KAPILA were born Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power: for he being born, and observing the world plunged in profound darkness by the succeeding series of worldly revolutions, was filled with compassion; and to his kinsman, the Bráhman ÁSURI, he communicated a knowledge of the TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES; from which knowledge the destruction of pain proceeds. As it is said; "He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever "order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear "braided hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated "(from existence): of this there is no doubt."

The inquiry is in consequence of the *embarrassment* of the three sorts of pain. In this place the three sorts of pain are, 1. (*ádhyátmika*) natural and inseparable; 2. (*ádhibhautika*) natural and extrinsic; and 3. (*ádhidaivika*) non-natural or superhuman. The first is of two kinds, corporeal and mental

corporeal is flux, fever, or the like, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm: mental is privation of what is liked, approximation of what is disliked. Extrinsic but natural pain is fourfold, according to the aggregation or elementary matter whence it originates; that is, it is produced by any created beings: whether viviparous, oviparous, generated by heat and moisture, or springing from the soil; or in short, by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles, gnats, musquitoes, lice, bugs, fish, alligators, sharks, trees, stones, &c. The third kind of pain may be called superhuman, *daivika* meaning either divine or atmospheric: in the latter case it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like.

Where then, or into what, is inquiry, in consequence of the embarrassment of three kinds of pain, to be made? *Into the means of precluding them.* This is the inquiry. *Nor is the inquiry superfluous.* That is; if this inquiry be (regarded as) superfluous, the means of precluding the three sorts of pain being obvious (seen); as for example; the internal means of alleviating the two inseparable kinds of pain are obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, bitter, and astringent decoctions, or through the removal of those objects that are disliked, and accession of those that are liked; so the obvious obstruction of pain from natural causes is protection and the like; and these means being obvious, any (farther) inquiry is superfluous: if you think in this manner, it is not so; for *absolute, certain, final, permanent,* obstruction (of pain) is not (to be effected) by obvious means. Therefore inquiry is to be made by the wise elsewhere, or into means of prevention which are absolute and final.

## COMMENT.

The first verse of the *Káriká* proposes the subject of the work, and not only of that, but of the system to which it belongs, and of every philosophical system studied by the

Hindus; the common end of which is, ascertainment of the means by which perpetual exemption from the metempsychosis, or from the necessity of repeated births, may be attained: for life is uniformly regarded by the Hindus as a condition of pain and suffering, as a state of bondage and evil; escape from which finally and for ever is a consummation devoutly to be wished.

The liberation thus proposed as the object of rational existence cannot be attained as long as man is subject to the ordinary infirmities of his nature, and the accidents of his condition: and the primary object of philosophical inquiry therefore is, the means by which the imperfections flesh is heir to may be obviated or removed. As preparatory then to their right determination, it is first shewn in the text what means are not conducive to this end; such, namely, as obvious but emporary expedients, whether physical or moral.

Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first umber of his *Gymnosophista*, containing the translation of he *Káriká*, has given a version differing in some respects rom Mr. Colebrooke's. He thus renders it: "E tergeminorum olorum impetu oritur desiderium cognoscendæ rationis, qua ii epellantur. Quod cognoscendi desiderium licet in visibilibus ebus infructuose versetur, non est (infructuosum) propter bsentiam absoluti, et omni ævo superstitis remedii."

In the first member of this sentence, the translation of *highála* by 'impetus' is irreconcilable with the context. The nse required by the doctrine laid down is 'impediment, nbarrassment, the prevention of liberation by worldly cares d sufferings.' So the same word *abhighátaka* is immediately ed to mean 'preventing, removing,' 'depellens." Professor ssen's text, it is true, reads *apaghátaka*, but this is not the ading followed by Mr. Colebrooke, nor that of the citation of e text given in the *Sânkhya Bhâshya* or *Sánkhya Kaumudi*; it that of the *S. Tatwa Kaumudi* and *S. Chandriká*, and although itself unobjectionable, yet is not a necessary nor preferable

variation. At any rate there can be no question that the word *abhighâta* may be used in the sense of 'depellere,' and that sense therefore equally attaches to it in the prior, member of the hemistich. So in the *Bhàshya* of GAURAPADA we have *ádhibhautikasya rakshádina abhighátah*; 'The prevention of extrinsic pain is by protection and the like.' It would not be possible here to render *abhighâta* by 'impetus.' By VACHASPATI the term *abhighàta* is defined 'the confinement of the sentient faculty (explained to mean here 'life'), through the impediment opposed by threefold distress abiding in spirit.'* NÁRÁYANA interprets it more concisely *asahya sambandha*,† 'intolerable restraint.' 'Embarrassment' therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these definitions, or the obstructions offered by worldly sufferings to the spirit anxious to be free.

This variation, however, is of no great consequence: the more important difference is in the second portion of the stanza and as Professor Lassen has deviated advisedly from Mr Colebrooke, it is necessary to examine the passage more in detail. The following are his reasons for the version he has made:

"Hæc posterioris versus (*drishté* etc.) interpretatio, sicut scholiastarum suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatu Quod ideo moneo, ne leviter rationem, a Colebrookio, v summo, in hoc versu enarrando initam deseruisse censear. enim: 'nor is the inquiry superfluous, because obvious mear of alleviation exist: for absolute and final relief is not thereb accomplished.' Sed vereover, ne vir summus constructione particulæ *chèt* sententiam claudentis et a negatione excep male intellexerit. De qua re dixi ad Hitop. procem. d. Ex interpret. Colebrook. construendum esset: *drishté sati* (i. e. *yadyapi drishtam vidyaté*) *sá* (*jijná*

* दुःखत्रयेणांतःकरणवर्त्तिना प्रतिकूलतया चेतनाशक्तेरभिसंबन्धोऽभिघातः
† असह्यसंबन्धः ।

*apàrthá na èkánt—abhávát.** Sed ut omittam, particulæ *chèt* nullum omnino relinqui locum in sententia, *na* inopportuno versus loco collocatum esse, non potes quin concedas. Male omnino se habet tota sententia et claudicat. Equidem construo: *drishté sá* (*jijnásá*) *apàrthá* (*bhavati*) *chèt* (*tathàpi*) *na* (*apárthá bhavati*) *èkantà—abhávát.*† Prorsus similiter dicitur *nábhávát* infr. v. 8. Ablativum igitur *ekántyatyantoh abhávát*, non ad *drishté* refero cum Colebrookio, sed ad negationem quæ cum supplementis suis apodosin constituit. Nam quæ post *chenná* sequuntur verba, ad apodosin pertinere semper observavi. Quam grammatica postulare videtur, patitur præterea loci tenor enarrationem, imo melior evadit sententia. Ad *drishté* enim relatis istis verbis, id tantum dicitur, rerum visibilium cognitione non attingi posse philosophiæ finem, liberationem absolutam et perpetuam a doloribus; mea posita enarratione non id tantum docetur, sed additur etiam hoc: finem istum posse attingi, licet alio cognitionis genere. Tres omnino positiones altero hemistichii versu continentur: philosophiæ (id enim valet *gignásá*, i. e. cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam et omne tempus transgredientem; deinde ad eum non perveniri ea via quæ primum initur, quia obvia quasi sit, i. e. remediorum a sensibilibus rebus petitorum ope; denique ea remedia cognoscendi desiderium posse expleri. Sed aliter atque Colebrookius hasce sententias inter se conjungit noster, et per conditionem effert, quod ille per negationem enuntiat."

In this view of the meaning of the verse, there is a refinement that does not belong to it, and which is not Indian: arguments are often elliptically and obscurely stated in Sanscrit dialectics, but one position at a time is usually sufficient for even Brahmanical subtlety. The only position here advanced

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* दृष्टे सति ( यद्यपि दृष्टं विद्यते ) सा ( जिज्ञासा ) अपार्था न एका-भावात् ।

† दृष्टे सा ( जिज्ञासा ) अपार्थां ( भवाति ) चेत् ( तथाऽपि ) न ( अपार्था भव- ) एकान्त-भावात ।

is, that the cure of worldly evil is not to be effected by suc remedies as are of obvious and ordinary application, as the can only afford temporary relief. Death itself is no exemptio from calamity, if it involves the obligation of being born agai

The version proposed by Professor Lassen rests upon h notion of the grammatical force of the expression *chenna* or *ch* 'if,' *na*, 'not:' the former he would refer to the prior memb of the sentence, the latter to the subsequent expressio But this division of the compound is not that which is mo usual in argumentative writings. The phrase is an ellipti negation of a preceding assertion, *chèt* referring to what h been said, implying, 'if you assert or belive this;' and meeting it with a *negatur*, 'it is not so:' then follows t reason or argument of the denial. Thus in the *Muktáva* 'But why should not Darkness be called a tenth *thing*, for is apprehended by perception? If this be said, it is not so ( *chén-na*); for it is the consequence of the non-existence absolute light, and it would be illogical to enumerate amongst things.'* So in the *Nyáya Sútra Vritti*: 'If b disturbance in the assembly there be no subsequent spee and through the want of a reply there be defeat; if this urged, it is not so (*iti chén-na*), because there has been opportunity for an answer.'† Again in the *Sankhya Pravacha Bháshya*. Sútra:—'If it be said that Prakriti is the ca of bondage, it is not so, from its dependent state.'‡ Comme —'But bondage may be occasioned by Prakriti. If this asserted, it is not so. Why? Because in the relation bondage, Prakriti is dependent upon conjunction, as will

* ननु दशमं द्रव्यं तम: कुतो नोक्तं? तद्धि प्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति चे॰ आवश्यकतेजोऽभावेनोपपत्तौ द्रव्यान्तरकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वात्।

† सभाक्षोभादिना चेदननुभाषणमेव उत्तराप्रतिपत्त्या चेदप्रतिभेति चेन्न–उ॰ वसराभावात्।

‡ प्रकृतिनिबन्धाचेन्न? तस्या अपि पारतन्त्र्यम।

plained in the following precept.'* Also in the *Vedánta ira Viviriti*: 'If in consequence of such texts of the Védas "let sacrifice be performed as long as life endures" their erformance is indispensable, and constant and occasional rites ust be celebrated by those engaged in the attainment of ue knowledge; and if, on the other hand, the attainment of ue knowledge is distinct from the observance of ceremonies; en a double duty is incumbent on those wishing to eschew e world. If this be asserted, it is not so (*iti chén-na*), from e compatibility of severalty with union, as in the case of ticles of khayra or other wood:'† that is, where there are veral obligations, that which is most essential may be select- l from the rest. In the same work we have an analogous rm used affirmatively; as, 'But how by the efficacy of nowledge, after the dissipation of ignorance, in regard to the ject (of philosophy), can the true nature of the essentially ppy (being) be attained? for as he is eternally existent, nowledge is not necessary to establish his existence. If this e asserted, it is true (*iti chét; satyam*). Brahme, one sentially with felicity, is admitted to be eternal, but in a ate of ignorance he is not obtained; like a piece of gold hich is forgotten (and sought for), whilst it is hanging round e neck.'‡ Here it would be impossible to refer *satyam* to e succeeding member of the sentence, as the apodosis being parated from it, not only by the sense, but by the particle *ni*. Passages of this description might be indefinitely

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* नन प्रकृतिनिमित्ताद्बन्धो भवात्विति चेन्न? यतस्तस्यां अपि बन्धकत्वे संयोग-
तंत्र्यमुत्तरसूत्रे वक्ष्यमाणमस्ति।

† ननु यज्ञादीनां यावज्जीवं वाक्येनावश्यकर्त्तव्यतया प्राप्तानां विविदिषार्थत्वे-
त्यानित्यसंयोगः प्रसज्येत। यदि च विविदिषार्थं यज्ञाद्यनुष्ठानमपरमिष्येत ततः सं-
रव्यामुमुक्षूनां द्विरनुष्ठानं स्यादितिचेन्न? खादिरादिवत्। संयोगपृथक्त्वोपपत्तेः।

‡ नन्वविद्यानिवृत्तेर्विद्यासाध्यत्वेन प्रयोजनत्वेऽपि कथं स्वरूपानन्दस्य। त-
त्वं तस्य नित्यप्राप्तत्वेन विद्यासाध्यत्वाभावादिति चेत् सत्यं नित्यं प्राप्तमप्यानन्दा-
ब्रह्मस्वरूपमविद्यावस्थायां विस्मृतकण्ठगतचामीकरवदनवाप्तं भवति।

multiplied, but these are sufficient to shew that the con-
struction in the sense adopted by Mr. Colebrooke is commo
and correct.

Accordingly his version is uniformly supported *scholiastaru suffragiis*. Thus in the *Sankya Bhàshya*, as we have seen, t passage is explained, *drishtè sá apártha chèt èram manyasè* *èkànta*, &c.; 'If by reason of there being obvious remedies, *y think* indeed the inquiry superfluous, no (it is not so), fro their not being absolute and permanent.' So in the *Sank Tatwa Kaumudi*, after stating the objection at length, the co mentator adds, *nirákaroti, na iti*; '(the author) refutes it ( saying), no, not so:' *kutah*, 'why'? *èkàntatyantatah abhàvá* The *Sankhra Chandriká* is to the same effect, or still more e plicit: 'There being obvious means, the inquiry is superfluo the conclusion being otherwise attained: if (this be urged) su is the meaning (of the text), (the author) contradicts it; no, it not so.† This commentator giving the very reading, *drish sati*, which Professor Lassen argues Mr. Colebrooke's versi would erroneously require. The remaining scholiast, RAM KRISHNA, adopts the comment of the *Chandriká* word for wor and consequently the commentators are unanimous in suppo of the translation of Mr. Colebrooke.

With respect to the passages referred to by Professor Lass as establishing the connection of the negative with the latt member of the sentence, instead of its being absolute, it wi be seen at once that they are not at all analogous to th passage in our text. They are declaratory, not argumentativ and the terms following the negative particle are the parts circumstances of the negative, not the reasons on which it grounded. Thus in the *Hitopadesa*: 'What will not be, wi

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* निराकरोति नेति । कुतः एकान्त-अभावात् ।

† दृष्टे सति सा जिज्ञासा अपार्था अन्यथासिद्धास्तीति चोदित्यर्थः । निषेधया नेति ।

not be; if it will be, it will not be otherwise.'* So in v. 8. of the *Káriká:* 'The non-apprehension of nature is from its subtlety, not from its nonentity†.' In neither of these is there any reference to a foregone position which must be admitted or denied, nor is the negative followed by the reasons for denial, as is the case in our text.

These considerations are more than sufficient to vindicate, what it was scarcely perhaps necessary to have asserted, Mr Colebrooke's accuracy; and they are now also somewhat superfluous, as I have been given to understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of his interpretation. The commentary of GAURAPADA distinctly shews that nothing more is intended by the text, than the unprofitableness of recourse to visible or worldly expedients for the relief or removal of worldly pain. In subjoining therefore the gloss of VACHESPATI MISRA, with a translation, it is intended rather to illustrate the doctrines of the text, and the mode of their development by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the correctness of the translation.

'‡ But verily the object of the science may not need inquiry, 1. if there be no pain in the world; 2. if there be no desire to

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* यदभावि न तद्भावि भाविचेन्नतदन्यथा ।

† सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्न तदभावात् ।

‡ एवं हि न शास्त्रविषयो जिज्ञास्येत यदि दुःखं नाम जगति न स्यात् । सद्वा न जिहासितं । जिहासितं स्याद्वाशक्यं समुच्छेदं। अशक्यसमुच्छेदता च द्वेधा । दुःखस्य नित्यत्वाद्वा तदुच्छेदोपायापरिज्ञानाद्वा । शक्यसमुच्छेदत्वेऽपि च शास्त्रविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यानुपायत्वाद्वा । सुकरोपायान्तरस्य सद्भावाद्वा । तत्र न तावद्दुःखं नास्ति नाप्यजिहासितमित्युक्तं । दुःखत्रयाभिघातादिति । दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयं । तत्खल्वाध्यात्मिकमाधिभौतिकमाधिदैविकं चेति । तत्राध्यात्मिकं द्विविधं शारीरं मानसं च । शारीरं वातपित्तश्लेष्मणां वैषम्यनिमित्तं । मानसं कामक्रोधलोभमोहभयेर्ष्याविषादविशेषदर्शननिबन्धनं । सर्वं चैतदन्तरोपायसाध्यत्वादाध्यात्मिकं दुःखं। बाह्योपायसाध्यं च दुःखं द्वेधा । आधिभौतिकमाधिदैविकं च । तत्राधिभौतिकं मानुषपशुमृगपक्षि सरीसृपस्थावरनिमित्तं । आधिदैविकं यक्षराक्षसविनायकग्रहा-

avoid it; 3. if there be no means of extirpating it. The im possibility of extirpating it is twofold; either from the eternit of pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviation: o though it be possible to extirpate pain, yet that knowledg which philosophy treats of may not be the means of its r moval; or again, there may be some other and more read means. In the text, however, it is not said that pain does n exist, nor that there is no wish to avoid it. *From the emba rassment of the three kinds of pain.*—A triad of pain, thr kinds: they are the *ádhyátmika*, 'Natural;' *ádhibhautik* 'extrinsic;' and *ádhidaivika*, 'superhuman.' The first is of tw kinds, bodily and mental; bodily is caused by disorder of t humours, wind, bile, and phlegm; mental is occasioned b desire, wrath, covetousness, fear, envy, grief, and want of di crimination. These various kinds of pain are called insepa able, from their admitting of internal remedies. The pa that requires external remedies is also twofold, *ádhibhautika* a *ádhidaivika*. The first has for its cause, man, beasts, dee birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; the second arises fro the evil influence of the planets, or possession by impure spiri (*Yakshas*, *Rákshasas*, *Vináyakas* &c.). These kinds of pa depending upon the vicissitudes arising from the quality foulness, are to be experienced by every individual, and cann be prevented. Through the obstruction occasioned by t three kinds of pain abiding in spirit, arises embarrassment,

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ग्रावेशनिबन्धनं । तदेत त् प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं दुःखं रजःपरिणामभेदो न शक्यं
त्याख्यातुं । तदनेन दुःखत्रयेणान्तःकरणवर्तिना प्रतिकूलतयाचेतनाशक्तेरभिसम्
न्धोऽभिघातः । एतावता प्रतिकूलवेदनीयत्वं जिहासाहेतुरुक्तः । यद्यपि न सा
रुध्यते दुःखं तथापि तदभिभवः शक्यः कर्तुमित्युपरिष्टान्निवेदयिष्यते । तथा च
पपन्नं तदपघातके हेताविति । तस्य दुःखत्रयस्यापघातकस्तदपघातकः । उप
ज्जेनस्यापि बुध्यानिःकृष्य तदापरमर्शः ॥ तदपघातकश्च हेतुः शास्त्रव्युत्पा
नान्य इत्याशयः ॥ तत्र शंकते । दृष्टे सापार्था चेत् । अयमर्थः । अस्तु दुःख
जिहासतु तच्चेतनः भवतु च तच्छक्यहानं सहतां च शास्त्रगम्य उपायास्तदुच्छे
त्तुं तथाप्यत्र जिज्ञासा प्रेक्षवता मयुक्ता । दृष्टस्यैवोपायस्य तदुच्छेदकस्य सुकर

confinement of the sentient faculty. The capability of knowing the impediment occasioned by such pain, is considered the cause of the desire to avoid it; for though pain may not be prevented, yet it is possible to overcome it, as will be subsequently explained. Pain then being generated, inquiry is to be made into the means of its removal. *Tad apaghàtaké*: *tad* refers here to the three kinds of pain, *tad* having the relation dependent upon its being used as subordinate (relative) term. *The means* (hetu) *of removing*—These are to be derived from philosophy, not from any other source: this is the position (of the text). To this a doubt is objected; *As there are obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous*; *if so*—. The sense is this: Be it admitted that there are three kinds of pain; that the rational being wishes to escape from them; that escape is practicable; and that means attainable through philosophy are adequate to their extirpation; still any investigation by those who look into the subject is needless; for there do exist obvious (visible) means of extirpation, which are easily attainable, whilst the knowledge of philosophical principles is difficult of attainment, and to be acquired only by long study, and traditional tuition through many generations. Therefore, according to the popular saying, "Why should a man who may find honey in the *arkka* flower, go for it to the mountain?" so what wise man will give himself unnecessary trouble, when he has attained the object of his wishes. Hundreds of remedies for

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ध्यमानत्वात् । तत्वज्ञानस्य त्वनेकजन्माभ्यासपरम्परायाससाध्यतयाऽतिदुष्कर-
त् । तथा च लौकिकानामाभाणकः ॥ अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं
ेत्। इष्टस्यार्थस्य सम्प्राप्तौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेदिति ॥ सन्ति चोपायाः शतशः
रीरदुःखप्रतीकारायेषत्करा भिषजां वरैरुपदिष्टाः । मानसस्यापि तापस्य प्रती-
राय मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानभोजनविलेपनवस्त्रालङ्कारादिविषयसम्प्राप्तिरुपाय ईषत्करः
माधिभौतिकस्यापि दुःखस्य नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासकुशलतानिरत्ययस्थानाध्या-
ादिः प्रतीकारहेतुरीषत्करः । तथाधिदैविकस्य दुःखस्य मणिमन्त्राद्युपयोगः
रः प्रतीकारोपाय इति । निराकरोति । नेति । कुतः । एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽ
ात् । एकान्तो दुःखनिवृत्तेरवश्यं भावः । अत्यन्तो दुःखस्यनिवृत्तस्य पुनर-

bodily affections are indicated by eminent physicians. Th pleasures of sense, women, wine, luxuries, unguents, dres ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental distres So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating it exis in the skill acquired by acquaintance with moral and politic science, and by residing in safe and healthy places, and th like; whilst the employment of gems and charms readil counteracts the evils induced by superhuman agency. This the objection. (The author) refutes it; *it is not so.* Why From these means *not being absolute or final. Ekanta* mea the certainty of the cessation of pain; *atyantá,* the no recurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of reli there is) the non-existence of both these properties; the af *tasi,* which may be substituted for all inflexions, being here p for the sixth case dual;—as it is said; "From not observi the (invariable) cessation of pain of various kinds, in cons quence of the employment of ceremonies, drugs, women, mo and political studies, charms, and the like, their want of certa operation (is predicated); so is their temporary influence, fr observing the recurrence of pain that had been suppress Although available, therefore, the obvious means of puttin stop to pain are neither absolute nor final, and consequen this inquiry (into other means) is not superfluous." This the purport (of the text).'

The *Sánkhya Chandrika* and *S. Kaumudi* are both to the sa effect, and it is unnecessary to cite them. The original *Sút* of KAPILA, as collected in the *S. Pravachana,* and commen on by VIJGNYA'NA BHIKSHU, confirm the view taken by scholiasts.

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नुत्पादः । तयोरेकान्तात्यन्तयोरभावात् । एकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभाव इति
द्विवचनस्थाने सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसि । एतदुक्तं भवति । यथा विधिरसायनका
नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासमन्त्राद्युपयोगेऽपि तस्य तस्याध्यात्मिकादेर्दुःखस्य निवृत्तेर
नादनैकान्तिकत्वं । निवृत्तस्यापि पुनरुत्पत्तिदर्शनादनात्यन्तिकत्वमिति ।
दोऽप्यैकान्तिकात्यन्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेर्न दृष्ट उपाय इति नापार्था जिज्ञासेति ॥

ùtra :—'The final cessation of the three kinds of pain is final object of soul.*'

Comment :—'The final cessation of these three kinds of pain, total cessation of universal pain, whether gross or subtle esent or to come), is the final, supreme object of soul †'

ùtra :—'The accomplishment of that cessation is not from ious means, from the evident recurrence (of pain) after pression.‡'

Comment :—'The accomplishment of the final cessation of n is not (to be effected) by worldly means, as wealth, and like. Whence is this? Because that pain of which the ation is procured by wealth and the like is seen to occur n, when that wealth and the rest are exhausted.'§

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दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः सह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः।
तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥२॥

II.

THE revealed mode is like the temporal one, ineffec- l, for it is impure; and it is defective in some pects, as well as excessive in others. A method erent from both is preferable, consisting in a dis- ninative knowledge of perceptible principles, and he imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul.

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अत्र त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ।

एषां त्रिविधदुःखानां यात्यन्तनिवृत्तिः स्थूलसूक्ष्मसाधारण्येन निःशेषतो नः सोऽत्यन्तः परमः पुरुषार्थः ।

न दृष्टात्तत्सिद्धिर्निवृत्तेरनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् ।

लौकिकादुपायाद्धनादेरत्यन्तदुःखनिवृत्तिसिद्धिर्नास्ति । कुतः । धनादिना निवृत्तेः पश्चाद्धनक्षये पुनरपि दुःखानुवृत्तिदर्शनात् ।

यदि दृष्टान्यत्रजिज्ञासा कार्य्या ततोऽपि नैव यत आनुश्रविके हेतुर्दुःखत्रयाभिघातकः । अनुश्रवतीत्यनुश्रवस्तत्रभवः आनुश्रविकः स च आगमात्सिद्धः । यथा

अपाम सोममममृता अभूमागन्मज्योतिराविदाम देवान्
किन्नूनमस्मान् कृणवदरातिः किमु धूर्त्तिरमृतमर्त्यस्य ॥

कदाचिदिन्द्रादीनां देवानां कल्प आसीत् । कथं वयममृता अभूमेति विचार्य्यामुंयस्माद्वयमपाम सोमं पीतवन्तः सोमं तस्मादमृता अभूम अमरा भूतवन्त इत्यर्थः किंच अगन्म ज्योतिः गतवतो लब्धवतो ज्योतिः स्वर्गमिति । अविदाम देवान् दिव्यान् विदितवन्तः । एवं च किन्नूनमस्मान् कृणवदरातिः नूनं निश्चितं किं अरातिः शत्रुरस्मान् कृणवत् कर्त्तेति किमु धूर्त्तिरमृतमर्त्यस्य धूर्त्तिर्जरा हिंसा वा किं करिष्यति अमृतमर्त्यस्य ॥ अन्यच्चवेदे श्रूयते आत्यन्तिकं फलं पशुवधेन । सर्वांल्लोकाञ्जयति मृत्युं तरति पाप्मानं तरति ब्रह्महत्यां तरति यो योऽश्वमेधेन यजत इति । एकान्तात्यन्तिके एव वेदोक्ते अपार्थैवजिज्ञासा इति न । उच्यते । दृष्टवदानुश्रविक इति दृष्टेन तुल्यो दृष्टवत् । कोऽसौ आनुश्रविकः कस्मात्स यस्मादविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः । अविशुद्धियुक्तः पशुघातात् तथाचोक्तं ।

षट् शतानि नियुज्यन्ते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहनि ।
अश्वमेधस्य वचनादूनानि पशुभिस्त्रिभिः ॥

यद्यपि श्रुतिस्मृतिविहितो धर्म्मस्तथापि मिश्रीभावादविशुद्धियुक्तइति । यथा

बहूनीन्द्रसहस्राणि देवानां च युगे युगे ।
कालेन समतीतानि कालो हि दुरतिक्रमः ॥

एवमिन्द्रादिनाशात्क्षययुक्तः । तथा ऽतिशयो विशेषस्तेन युक्तः। विशेषगुणादर्शनादितरस्य दुःखं स्यादिति । एवमानुश्रविको- ऽपि हेतुर्दृष्टवत् ॥ कस्तर्हि श्रेयानितिचेत् । उच्यते । तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् ताभ्यां दृष्टानुश्रविकाभ्यां विपरीतः श्रेयान् प्रशस्यतर इति । अविशुद्धिक्षयातिशयायुक्तत्वात् । स कथमित्याह । व्य- क्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् तत्र व्यक्तं महदादिबुद्धिरहंकारः पञ्च त- न्मात्राणि एकादशेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चमहाभूतानि । अव्यक्तं प्रधानं । ज्ञःपुरुषः । एवमेतानि पञ्चविंशति तत्वानि व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानि कथ्यन्ते एतद्विज्ञानाच्छ्रेय इत्युक्तं च पञ्चविंशति तत्वज्ञ इति॥ अथ व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां को विशेष इत्युच्यते ।

## BHASHYA.

Although the inquiry is to be directed to other than to obvious remedies, yet it is not to be directed to such as are derivable from revelation, as means of removing the three kinds of pain. *Anusravati*, 'what man successively hears;' *anusravika*, 'that which is thence produced, revealed mode;' that is, established by the Védas: as it is said; "We drank the juice of the acid asclepias; we became immortal; we attained effulgence; we know divine things. What harm can a foe inflict on us? How can decay affect an immortal?" (This text of the Véda refers to) a discussion amongst Indra and other gods, as to how they became immortal. In explanation it was said, "we were drinkers of *soma* juice, and thence became immortal," that is, gods: further, "We ascended to, or attained effulgence, or heaven; we knew divine, celestial, things. Hence then, assuredly, what can an enemy do to us? What decay can affect an immortal?" *dhurtti* meaning 'decay' or 'injury:' 'What can it do to an immortal being?'

It is also said in the Védas, that final recompense is obtained by animal sacrifice: "He who offers the *ashwamédha* conquers all worlds, overcomes death, and expiates all sin, even the

murder of a Brahman." As, therefore, final and absolute consequence is prescribed in the Védas, inquiry (elsewhere) should be superfluous; but this is not the case. The text says, *the revealed mode is like the temporal one—drishtavat*; 'like, same as the temporal,' *drishtena tulya*. What is that revealed mode, and whence is it (ineffectual)? *It is impure, defective in some respects, and excessive in others.* It is impure from (enjoining) animal sacrifices; as, "according to the ritual of the *ashwamedha*, six hundred horses, minus three, are offered at midday." For though that is virtue which is enjoined by the Vedas and laws, yet, from its miscellaneous character, it may be affected by impurity. It is also said; "Many thousands of Indras and other gods have passed away in successive ages, overcome by time; for time is hard to overcome." Hence therefore, as even Indra and the gods perish, the revealed mode involves defective cessation of pain. Excess is also one of its properties, and pain is produced by observing the superior advantages of others. Here, therefore, by excess, *atisaya* is understood the unequal distribution of temporal rewards, as the consequence of sacrifice; the object of the ritual of the Védas being in fact in all cases temporal good. Therefore the revealed mode is like the temporal one. What then is the preferable mode? If this be asked, it is replied, *One different from both.* A mode different from both the temporal and revealed is preferable, being free from impurity, excess, or deficiency. How is this? It is explained (in the text: *It consists in a discriminative knowledge* &c. Here, by *perceptible principles*, are intended *Mahat* and the rest, or Intellect, Egotism, the five subtile rudiments, the eleven organs (of perception and action), and the five gross elements. The *imperceptible one* is *Pradhana* (the chief or great one). *The thinking soul, Purusha* (the incorporeal). These twentyfive principles are intended by the (three) terms *vyakta, avyakta*, and *jna*. In discriminative knowledge of these consists the preferable mode; and he who knows them knows the twenty-five principles (he has perfect knowledge).

The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible, and thinking principles, is next explained.

# COMMENT.

Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly evil are ineffectual, it is next asserted that devotional remedies, such as the rites enjoined by the Védas, are equally unavailing; and knowledge of the three parts or divisions of existence material and spiritual, is the only mode by which exemption from the infirmities of corporeal being can be attained.

The Védas are inefficient, from their inhumanity in prescribing the shedding of blood: the rewards which they propose are also but temporary, as the gods themselves are finite beings, perishing in each periodical revolution. The immortality spoken of in the Védas is merely a long duration, or until a dissolution of the existent forms of things*. The Védas also cause, instead of curing pain, as the blessings they promise to one man over another are sources of envy and misery to those who do not possess them. Such is the sense given by GAURAPADA to *àtisaya*, and the *Sankhya Tatwa Kaumudi* understands it also to imply the unequal apportionment of rewards by the Védas themselves: 'The *jyotishtoma* and other rites secure simply heaven; the *vajapéya* and others confer the sovereignty of heaven: this is being possessed of the property of excess (inequality)†.'

In like manner, the original aphorism of KAPILA affirms of these two modes, the temporal and revealed, that there 'is no difference between them,'‡ and that 'escape from pain is not the consequence of the latter,'|| because 'recurrence is neverthe-

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* अमृतत्वाभिधानं चिरस्थे मानमुपलक्षयति यदाह आभूतसम्प्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं भाष्यते ॥ विष्णु पुराणं ॥

† ज्योतिष्टोमादयः स्वर्गमात्रसाधनं वाजपेयादयः स्वराज्यस्येत्यतिशययुक्तत्वं ।

‡ अविशेषश्चोभयोः ।

|| नानुश्रविकादपि तत् सिद्धिः ।

less the result of that immunity which is attainable by acts (of devotion),'* as 'the consequences of acts are not eternal.'† Here however a dilemma occurs, for the Véda also says, 'There is no return (regeneration) of one who has attained the sphere of Brahma by acts (of devotion).'‡ This is explained away by a Sútra of Kapila, which declares that the Véda limits the non-regeneration of one who has attained the region of Brahmá to him who, when there, acquires discriminative wisdom.§

This discriminative wisdom is the accurate discrimination of those principles into which all that exists is distributed by the *Sánkhya* philosophy. *Vyakta,* 'that which is perceived, sensible, discrete;' *Avyakta,* 'that which is unperceived, indiscrete;' and *Jna,* 'that which knows, or discriminates:' the first is matter in its perceptible modifications; the second is crude, unmodified matter; and the third is soul. The object of the *Sánkhya Karika* is to define and explain these three things, the correct knowledge of which is of itself release from worldly bondage, and exemption from exposure to human ills, by the final separation of soul from body.

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मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥३॥

## III.

Nature, the root (of all), is no production. Seven principles, the *Great* or intellectual one, &c., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive.

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* कर्म्मसाध्यत्वेन पुनरावृत्तिः ।

† कर्म्मसाध्यस्य चानित्यत्वे ।

‡ कर्म्मणा ब्रह्मलोकगतस्यानावृत्तिः ।

§ तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः ।

मूलप्रकृतिः प्रधानं । प्रकृतिविकृतिसप्तकस्य मूलभूतत्वात् । मूलं च साप्रकृतिश्च मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः । अन्यस्मान्नोत्पद्यते तेन प्रकृतिः कस्यचिद्विकारो न भवति । महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त । महाभूतादिति बुद्धिः बुद्ध्याद्याः सप्त बुद्धि १ अहंकारः २ पञ्चतन्मात्राणि ५ एतानि सप्तप्रकृतिविकृतयः । तद्यथा । प्रधानाद्बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तेनविकृतिः प्रधानस्य विकार इति सैवाहंकारमुत्पादयति अतः प्रकृतिः । अहंकारोऽपि बुद्धेरुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिः स च पञ्चतन्मात्राण्युत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रमहंकारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिस्तस्मादाकाशमुत्पद्यत इति प्रकृतिः । तथा स्पर्शतन्मात्रमहंकारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिस्तदेवं वायुमुत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । गन्धतन्मात्रमहंकारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिस्तदेवं पृथिवीमुत्पादयतीतिप्रकृतिः । रूपतन्मात्रमहंकारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिस्तदेवं तेज उत्पादयतीतिप्रकृतिः । रसतन्मात्रमहंकारादुत्पद्यत इति विकृतिस्तदेवं आप उत्पादयतीति प्रकृतिः । एवं महदाद्याः सप्त प्रकृतयो विकृतयश्च ॥ षोडशकश्च विकारः पञ्चबुद्धीन्द्रियाणि पञ्चकर्म्मेन्द्रियाणि एकादशं मनः पञ्चमहाभूतानि एष षोडशको गणो विकृतिरेव । विकारो विकृतिः ॥ न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ एवमेषां व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञानां त्रयाणां पदार्थानां कैः कियद्भिः प्रमाणैः केन कस्य वा प्रमाणेन सिद्धिर्भवति । इह लोके प्रमेयवस्तु प्रमाणेन साध्यते यथा प्रस्थादिभिर्व्रीहयस्तुलया चन्दनादि । तस्मात् प्रमाणमभिधेयम् ।

BHÁSHYA.

*Múla* (the root) *prakriti* (nature) is *pradhána* (chief), from its being the root of the seven principles which are productions

and productive; such nature is the root. *No production.*—It is not produced from another: on that account nature *(prakriti)* is no product of any other thing. *Seven principles.*—*Mahat* and the rest; from its being the great *(mahat)* element; this is Intellect *(Buddhi)*. *Intellect and the rest.*—The seven principles are, 1. Intellect; 2. Egotism; 3—7. The five subtile rudiments. These seven are productions and productive: in this manner: Intellect is produced from the *chief* one (nature). That again produces Egotism, whence it is productive *(prakriti)*. Egotism, as derived from intellect, is a production; but as it gives origin to the five subtile rudiments, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of sound is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production; but as causing the production of ether, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of touch, as generated from Egotism, is a production; as giving origin to air, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of smell is derived from Egotism, and is therefore a production; it gives origin to earth, and is therefore productive. The subtile rudiment of form is a production from Egotism; as generating light, it is productive. The subtile rudiment of flavour, as derived from Egotism, is a production; it is productive, as giving origin to water. In this manner the *Great* principle and the rest are productions and productive. *Sixteen are productions*; that is, the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, with mind, making the eleventh, and the five elements: these form a class of sixteen which are productions, the term *vikára* being the same as *vikriti*. Soul is neither a production nor productive. These (principels) being thus classed, it is next to be considered by what and how many kinds of proof, and by what proof severally applied, the demonstration of these three (classes of) principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and the thinking soul, can be effected. For in this world a probable thing is established by proof, in the same mode as (a quantity of) grain by a *prastha* (a certain measure), and the like, or sandal and other things by weight. On this account what proof is, is next to be defined.